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Introduction by Greg Donaghy

David Haglund. Ethnic Diasporas and the Canadian United States Security Community  
New York Rowman and Littlefield, 2015 ISBN: 978-1-4422-4269-2 (hardback, \$84.00) 978-1-  
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Introduction by Greg Donaghy, Historical Section, Global Affairs Canada

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Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, ethnic diasporas and their security implications have loomed large in popular and scholarly discussions of contemporary international relations. Unfortunately, those fraught and overwrought discussions have not always been particularly edifying. The frightening march of homegrown Islamic radicals through the streets of Boston, Paris, and even placid Ottawa has sparked nativist reactions in Europe, the U.S., and Canada, as well as persistent suspicions of ethnic dangers lurking just beyond the border. Since 9/11, wild speculation that jihadi terrorists targeted the U.S. led up in Canadian safe houses has driven Canadians to distrust and encouraged the securitization of the Canada U.S. border. For many analysts, this state of affairs is a novel and unique development, one likely to strain North American security relations. Political science professor David Haglund of Queen's University (Kingston, Ontario) thoroughly debunks this view in his most recent book, *Ethnic Diasporas and the Canada United States Security Community*, which grounds consideration of North American ethnic diasporas in their full historical setting.

*Ethnic Diasporas* is a compact and nicely organized work. It opens with three chapters where Haglund clearly lays out his main theoretical concepts, reflecting on the nature of U.S.-Canada security relations, the definition and evolution of the North American security community, and the impact of diasporas on international relations and foreign policy. These ideas are applied in three chapters providing historical case studies on the Irish-American, the German-American, and the Muslim communities in North America. Witty, literate, and sophisticated, *Ethnic Diasporas* judiciously weighs the influence of diasporas on Canada U.S. relations before ultimately dismissing the notion that diasporas offer mu

broadbased nationalist radicalism of the Irish diaspora, and the nature of contemporary Islamic radicalism,

enjeux sécuritaires au Canada depuis le 11 septembre (Brousseau Peter Lang, 2011) [Contrôle et sécurisation des zones frontalières: Pratiques et discours en France \(Patia Mahdioudiar3 -1.2727v \(3 -1.22 \(e](#)

Review by Stéphane Roussel, École nationale d'Administration publique Montréal

avid G. Haglund ranks among the most prolific authors on Canadian security issues. He established his name as a leading figure of the Canadian “atlantist” school, i.e. scholars who investigate the historical, strategic and economic links between Canada and Europe, and stressing their importance for the former. But Haglund is also well known for his works on U.S. foreign policy and United States security relations. Over the past ten years, his publications have focused largely on these last two areas. While Ethnic Diasporas cannot, properly speaking, be viewed as a long research program (many other dimensions of the topic that the author addressed elsewhere are not present in this book, as we shall see later), it appears to be the product of a deep investigation on a very specific topic.

The central purpose of this book is to assess if ‘diasporas’ established in the United States or Canada had an impact on the two nations’ security relations. More precisely, Haglund’s main argument is that the activities of diasporas delayed the establishment of the ‘North American security community.’ The book is divided into six chapters, the first three dealing with theory, while the others are devoted to three case studies.

gradually acquired the status of independent state during the interwars years (with the date of 6 December 1931 as a marker, when the Statute of Westminster was proclaimed), a process that was completed by the end of the Second World War (4 Feb 1947). This was the case of the US Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.



Changing the moment when the security community emerged from 1937 to an earlier date (somewhere between the 'great rapprochement' between the British Empire and the U.S. in the second half of the 1890s and 1914) could have a significant impact on this line of argument. On one hand, it means that the three case



## H-Diplo Roundtable Review

Review by Eric Tabuteau, Université Jean Moulin, Lyon

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istory will teach us nothing” claimed a celebrated 1980s pop singer who argued that he would not learn anything useful from this subject at school. While scholars undoubtedly and justifiably scorn snap judgements of that kind, they are also aware that such easy aphorisms have unfortunately become commonplace in many a contemporary writing, and that, in this respect, studies devoted to North America are not spared, not even those that concentrate on as specific a subject as the North American community. That type of approach is a far cry from David Haglund’s latest publication, *Ethnic Diasporas and the Canadian United States Security Community*, which functions as an antidote to mass hallucination and collective amnesia. Professor Haglund is a political scientist by training, not a historian, but he makes it clear from the very first pages that his book takes history seriously (8), a claim that is corroborated by the subtitle he has chosen, *From the Civil War to Today*. At the least one can say is that his work illustrates French Historian Marc Bloch’s worry that “it is necessary to be fully aware of the past to understand the present, but knowing current events also permits us to better grasp **the past**” is forcibly made in the introduction when the academic contends that “both the United States and Canada have been nothing if not the product of demographic fluxes that started four centuries ago” (3), and when he

countries would only belong to speculative fiction, Canadians as well as Americans were accustomed to seeing border guards at some checkpoints on the 49<sup>th</sup> parallel simply placing orange cones in the

precedes action as lightning precedes thunder. Reasoning by analogy, is it justified to take such war planning activities at face value, or is it possible to consider that they are just innocuous speculations – unless they maybe go awry, as everyone knows even the oldest allies do not trust each other – as Wikileaks has now long reported without triggering t(n)6.3 14t trIB ( th)1.1 (a)-3 Tc -0T Tw 0.21 0 Td 0T j 0.raginatil0T T4(r)2

to what extent the crises that shook the British Isles were continuously exported to the New World and



convey a note of pessimism that emerges from the comparison between traditional diasporic activism – Irish or German for that matter – and jihadism whose objectives differ totally. Just as Irish activism disappeared with the creation of the Irish Free State, German activism vanished almost instantaneously when the U.S. entered the war; but that is a far cry from jihadism, which is disconnected from traditional political or territorial claims, and it is therefore difficult to capitalize on its eradication in the near future (245). However, that note of pessimism is counterbalanced by the fact that the fight against terrorism has strengthened the security community in North America more than it has weakened it, what the author best sums up as “the principle of the opposite effect” (227).

Those are the few reflections that reading *Ethnic Diasporas and the United States Security Community: From the Civil War to Today* inspired in me. I am aware that there are be many more aspects to cover as this book proposes nothing less than encyclopaedic knowledge on the subject. That is why, as V.S. Naipaul once

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pinpoint the exact date from which we can talk about a “security community” between Canada and the United States (60). He successfully manages to demonstrate that the fears of leading academics Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and Samuel Huntington about the influence of ethnic American policy have been exaggerated (91). Finally, the theory of the “opposite effect,” which he introduces to suggest that the opposition of the Irish-Americans and German-Americans to a strong North American security community may have actually hastened the formation thereof, or that homegrown terrorism may have brought Canada and the United States together rather than driving them apart, also opens up new perspectives on the influence of ethnic diasporas on the North American security community. This theory, as Haglund notes, could be further developed in another volume, which we will hopefully be reading in the future. In the meantime, I would like to thank the author personally for this provocative and stimulating book and for the impressive amount of research that lies behind it.

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Author's Response by David Haglund, Queen's University

analogy and case studies can be helpful (because necessary), they can also wildly mislead us. Thus Sandrine Tolazzi's critique is apt, for three reasons. First, she queries my assertion that the North American Muslim diaspora, precisely because it lacks the "final" (state, really) affective referent object that served to animate both Irish and German American diasporic activism, is likely to be less capable of pursuing a coherent political agenda than either of the earlier ethnic "lobbies." Second, she questions the importance of a diaspora's size to its "kinetic" (i.e., nonviolent and legal) political activism, with my perspective being that simply because of demographic heft, the Irish American and German American diasporas possessed much more political leverage (exercised via the ballot) than Muslim North Americans could ever hope to attain. Instead, Tolazzi argues that the Muslim diaspora almost succeeded in incorporating aspects of the Sharia into the Canadian judicial system by claiming their right to use the Arbitration Act to settle family disputes through religious tribunals in 2003." Whether or not this was as closely run an affair as she implies, it is hard for me to see how its effect upon the Canadian security community (which is, as Stéphane Roussel notes, my "dependent variable") could have been anyway near as significant as some of the major Irish German American agenda items during an earlier period. Nevertheless, she makes a good point.

Third, Professor Tolazzi raises an interesting conundrum, one that I confess causes me no little consternation. What if, she suggests, the changing face of Salafist jihadism is such that new technologies (especially associated with social media) can break the earlier link between (nonviolent) activism and the presence of a diaspora? After all, a point upon which I have insisted through the three case studies is that there must be some trivial demographic presence of a diaspora in one (or both) of the North American host countries, if there is to be activism with regional implications. Indeed, I even go so far (page 92) to invoke the "agrarian socialism" theory of Communist China's founder and longtime leader, Mao Zedong, to make a claim about diasporic activism of a kinetic nature, with the diaspora constituting the "lake" in which the revolutionary agents swim. But what if one can become, through the Internet, a convert to Salafist jihadism even in a country where there has been no local Muslim diaspora? It is conceivable that this might happen, though I for one suspect that the absence of a visible Salafist jihadi presence in, say, Mexico, has a great deal to do with the size of the diasporic "lake." And, further to this issue, recent developments in Europe might suggest that a demographic footprint remains a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for kinetic activism to take place. This, to me at least, is the meaning of Molenbeek.

This gets us to a different element of disputation, one raised by Eric Tabor, who chides me for going a bit too lightly on recent trends in the North American border regime, regretting as he does that I "focused on the history of the frontier prior to 9/11 and do not really say whether its recent smartifying, nay partial bunkerization, has meant – or not – a sea change in the way North Americans view the line that bisects their continent, maybe feeling that their country has transformed from a zone of peace to a zone of war." From having attended many conferences in Europe and having read many European experts on the topic, I know fully well that since 9/11 the North American border regime has taken on a new and very interesting symbolism for Europeans, who never seem to tire of desecrating and decrying what they more often than not assume to be a budding militarization of the erstwhile "longest undefended border in the world." However, recent events

There was a time when border management in North America (north of the Rio Grande, at least) was relatively noncontroversial, consisting basically in exercise in commercial and fiscal policy, rather than in population control. This was particularly so during the first half of the twentieth century when borders in Europe were heavily fortified and militarized, such that it was possible, virtually obligatory for so many Canadians and Americans to sing praises to their wonderful border and to their diligent 'American Idea'. Then came the turn of the Western Europeans to wag fingers at North Americans, particularly Americans, for their excessive border management zeal. Now, over the past year or so, we glimpse a new and exciting era, thanks in part to the current refugee crisis, and in part to the

To understand the impact of the Irish, especially the German-American diasporas on regional security in  
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public came to realize, and to resent, that civilization was being condemned in the two diasporas' sustained onslaught against English civilization. We are told these days, and not just by constructivists (for Huntington also agreed with them) that the 'identity' prefigures interest. If this is so, then it may well be that the next promising frontier for research into American involvement in the First World War is the 'ontologicalone.

But whether or not this is such a looming frontier, the experience of that war speaks volumes about the sequencing of stable peace (on the assumption, of course, that the U.S. security community is a more recent phenomenon than many believe): for if in 1917 and 1918 America and Canada were their security community had yet to be born, then it would appear that Professor Rousset is right to deny, as he does, that security community must lead to alliance – but not necessarily for the reasons he would prefer. If alliance can predate security community, then the two kinds of security dispensation might be said, pace stable peace theory, actually to exist independently of each other. I am happy with this thought, as I like to believe that the solidity of the Canada-U.S. alliance – which, be it recalled, is America's most long ' did not bec (a)2 (o)-3.1 S (re) 44 (o) 4.7 (g) 2.7. 8 (1) 3.5) 15 (1) 8.5 (a) 13.5 (d) 112 (o) 2.9 (g) 7.1.8-



against its greater rivals in Europe, the Second World War, most of Germany was as opposed to Nazism as the rest of the country. The current Salafist challenge is more difficult to defeat, because the objective of the wielders of violence really is not (the temporary existence of the Islamic State to the contrary, notwithstanding) to promote the interests of a state. It is to propagate something much more amorphous, an ideology.

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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); and John A. Hawgood, *The Tragedy of Germany: The Germans in the United States of America during the Nineteenth Century* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940).